A top-down creation of a cultural cluster for urban regeneration: The case of OCT Loft, Shenzhen by Son, JW et al.
 1 
A Top-Down Creation of a Cultural Cluster for Urban 
Regeneration: The Case of OCT Loft, Shenzhen  
 
Jung Won Sonn*,%,,#, Kelly Wanjing Chen**, He Wang+, and Xiao Liu++,^ 
 
*Bartlett School of Planning, University College London 
%Institute of Management and Policy, Chinese Academy of Science 
**Department of Geography, University of Wisconsin, Madison 
+Department of Public Policy, City University of Hong Kong 
++College of Management, Shenzhen University 
^Corresponding author 
#During this research, Jung Won Sonn had financial support from the Ministry of Education of 
the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea, grant code NRF-
2015S1A3A2047036. 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Researchers of related topics agree that the large-scale top-down development of a 
creative cluster by a real estate developer may obstruct rather than facilitate creativity and 
creative entrepreneurialism. OCT Loft, a design industry park in Shenzhen, China, is 
being celebrated as an exception. Based on analyses of primary and secondary data, we 
find that the Loft’s success can be attributed to two factors. First, the choice of design as 
the target industry was appropriate. Design is a fast-growing industry and thus needs 
space for expansion. Second, the developer chose tenants with good reputations in the 
industry rather than those offering the highest rent. Both these factors are difficult to 
implement. First, a growing industry is hard to find in a city where urban regeneration is 
needed. Second, the majority of developers cannot pass up maximising rent for a good 
reputation as OCT did. Indeed, OCT was able to pursue the Loft’s creative success 
because giving a good impression to potential clients was expected to result in future 
opportunities that would raise profit further. In sum, a large-scale top-down development 
can facilitate creative entrepreneurialism but only when the developer is not hasty in 
demanding an immediate return on investment. 
 
KEYWORDS: Shenzhen, China; cultural industry cluster; creative industry cluster; urban 
regeneration, Overseas Chinese Town (OCT); design industry. 
1. Introduction 
The predominant view in the literature on creative industry and creative clusters is 
that a large-scale top-down development by a real estate developer or the government to 
construct a creative cluster is likely to result in a strict environment in which creative 
thinking is discouraged. This view also asserts that a large input of capital is likely to 
result in gentrification, pricing out creative individuals and small firms and thereby 
killing the vibrancy of the area. From this perspective, the endogenous development of 
local cultural communities and bottom-up efforts to preserve such communities are 
effective at fostering creative development. 
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Huaqiaocheng Chuangyi Wenhua Yuan (‘华侨城创意文化园’), or OCT Loft, is 
regarded as an exception. OCT Loft, located in the northeast corner of Huaqiaocheng, 
Shenzhen, is a cultural and creative industry-led regeneration based in an abandoned 
industrial complex. Established in 2004, the South Park was first developed for design, 
photography, animation, and fine art. The North Park was finished in 2007, focusing on 
the creative design industry, including artistic trading and display platforms. Over the 
past decade, OCT Loft has become the largest design cluster in Shenzhen as well as one 
of the largest creative industry clusters in China. Its fusion of art and design products has 
also become a tourist hotspot. For us, the most interesting character of the Loft is that it 
was planned and managed in a top-down manner by the developer. In the planning stage, 
the developer offered few opportunities for citizens, small businesses, or workers to 
participate in the decision-making process. Further, the management of the Loft since its 
opening has continued in a similar manner. 
This study addresses three related questions. First, is this design industry park an 
exception to the established findings? Second, if it is an exception, what enabled OCT 
Loft to accomplish what others could not? Third, can the same approach be applied to 
other projects? 
We combined primary and secondary data to analyse this cluster. Primary data were 
collected by the authors through site visits, seven brief face-to-face interviews, 13 in-
depth face-to-face interviews, and five in-depth telephone interviews from February 2012 
to July 2015. The in-depth interviewees included key informants such as high-ranking 
managers of real estate development companies, leaders of cultural communities in 
Shenzhen, shop owners in the Loft, a national brand fashion company manager, public 
sector urban planners and designers, OCT Loft Company employees, and employees of 
the architectural firm that designed the Loft. Secondary data were collected from various 
official and unofficial websites of selected cultural industry clusters, newspaper articles, 
and policy documents by local governments and the developer. The names of the 
interviewees that appear in this paper are pseudonyms. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The second section reviews studies of 
cultural industry clusters in China, especially the predominant critiques on the top-down 
management style. The third section examines the development trajectory of OCT, 
followed by a close evaluation of its success in the fourth section. The fifth section seeks 
to explain this exceptional successful case. Finally, we conclude with policy implications. 
 
2. Criticism of the top-down management style in the development of the 
cultural industry cluster in China and beyond 
Cultural industry clusters, creative cities, creative clusters, culture-led regeneration, 
and other related concepts have gained worldwide prevalence in research and 
policymaking on economic and urban development (Florida, 2002, 2005; Hall, 1998, 
2000; Markusen, 2013; Scott, 1996, 1997). In the Chinese context, research on cultural 
industry clusters and culture-led urban regeneration is relatively new, but is expanding 
rapidly. Historical descriptions of notable cultural industry clusters such as Liulichang 
(Sun, 2010), Songzhuang (Liu, Han, and O’Connor, 2013; Sun, 2010), and 798 (Wang 
and Li, 2009; Sun, 2010; Liu, Han, and O’Connor, 2013) in Beijing, M50 (Zhong, 2010) 
in Shanghai, and White Horse Lake in Hangzhou (Wen, 2012) have been documented. 
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Culture-led regeneration sites such as Nanluoguxiang, Beijing (Shin, 2010) and Red 
Town, Shanghai (Wang and Li, 2009; Zhong, 2010) have also been reported. Even Dafen 
Oil Painting Village, the world’s largest concentration of art replica producers, has 
attracted academic attention (Li, Cheng, and Wang, 2014). There has also been an 
ambitious attempt to chart the landscape of cultural districts across China (Webster, 
Muller, and Cai, 2011: 365–366). National and local governmental policies as a context 
for cluster development have also been studied. Kean (2009a, 2009b) focuses on the 
national framework, while White and Xu (2012) describe how the national framework 
interacts with Shanghai’s local history and political elite’s efforts toward transforming 
the city. The locational analysis of cultural industry clusters has also been published. Liu, 
Han, and O’Connor (2013) find some evidence that cultural industry clusters in Beijing 
are often situated on the city’s fringe where cheaper industrial buildings exist because of 
the relocation of firms. On the contrary, clusters in Shanghai are located in historical 
districts according to He and Gebhardt (2013). 
The criticism of cultural industry clusters in China is similar to that in Western 
Europe and North America. To improve the aesthetic appeal to a ‘creative class’ 
(O’Connor and Gu, 2012: 1), so-called cultural industry clusters overcommercialise 
culture and lose the authenticity that distinguishes cultural products from other products 
(Keane, 2009a, 2011; White and Xu, 2012). In the process, ‘history and memory are 
romanticized and sanitized, and the concept of art and artists is redefined’ (Wang, 2009: 
329). This tendency often results in increasing real estate prices, which drives out artists 
(Wang and Li, 2009) and undermines the vibrancy of creative clusters. According to 
Wang (2009: 329), ‘the irony is that while the project was initially based on artists’ space 
consumption, these artists themselves—particularly the struggling ones—were not truly 
welcome in the new creative community’. In the end, little of the cultural industry cluster 
development contributes to nurturing a creative workforce or creative entrepreneurism 
(Zheng, 2011). In this context, He and Gebhardt (2013) criticise clusters in Shanghai for 
being planned and developed by the government and developers more for tourists than 
for creative industries. Ren and Sun (2011) attribute these problems to the fact that the 
clusters were developed top-down by real estate developers and the local government 
rather than bottom-up by artists and residents. 
The survival of creativity in a government-controlled environment is considered to 
be near impossible. For example, Ren and Sun (2012: 518) ask whether the government’s 
control over clusters will ‘suffocate urban creativity’ or lead to the migration of creativity. 
This view is in line with the observations of many researchers. Webster, Muller, and Cai 
(2011) claim that ‘the most successful bottom-up cultural industry clusters are driven 
initially by the artists …not by intermediate property developers’ (365–366). This is 
rather surprising to us because even 798, which was considered to have formed 
spontaneously, has actually received increasing support from central and local 
governments in recent years (Zhang, forthcoming). 
Unfortunately, the naïve celebration of spontaneity and neglect of the effect of top-
down management measures are both common in writings on various kinds of creativity. 
Howkins (2010), a renowned consultant in cultural industries and policies, argues that 
although everyone has creative potential, such potential can only be realised when people 
are given freedom. Even in high-tech industries, economic geographers have argued that 
the success of Silicon Valley is partly a result of northern California’s hippie culture in 
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which all individuals are equal and are allowed to express their ideas without being 
restricted by the social hierarchy (Saxenian, 1994). This view of individual creativity 
seems to be an assumption in endogenous regional growth concepts such as the regional 
innovation system (Braczyk, Cooke, and Heidenreich, 1998) and institutional thickness 
(Amin and Thrift, 1994), among others, which reject political intervention by the national 
government. 
Although less known outside China, OCT Loft, a design industry park and cultural 
quarter, is celebrated as an exception to the predominant view in the literature. Both 
academics (O’Connor and Liu, 2014) and journalists (O’Donnell, 2012) depict this major 
project as an emerging national centre of the design industry and an attractive cultural 
venue. Its success has been expressed not only by the job opportunities and GDP growth 
it has created—in 2015, OCT Loft generated an output of 11.2 billion CNY and 2,000 
employment opportunities—but also by its reputation within the design industry, the 
cultural products it has generated, and the associated goodwill. On 19 November 2008, 
Shenzhen was invited by UNESCO to join the creative network and was awarded a ‘City 
of Design’ recognition. Several of our interviewees claimed that OCT Loft contributed to 
such international recognition. In the following sections, we examine how and why the 
Loft is different from other large-scale top-down developments. 
 
<Figure 1. Location of OCT Loft in Shenzhen> 
 
3. Is OCT Loft different from other major culture-themed developments? 
3.1 OCT Loft and its developer 
In the context of OCT Loft, Shenzhen was the first of China’s five special economic 
zones and the most successful one. The Shenzhen Special Economic Zone was opened in 
1979 by Deng Xiaoping, who realised that the city’s proximity to Hong Kong made it a 
good site to experiment with an open economy. Since then, the city has developed rapidly. 
In 1979, Shenzhen was a fishing village inhabited by several thousand residents. 
Currently, it is a major city with 10 million residents, about six million of whom are 
migrant workers housed in factory dormitories. 
In the beginning, the city grew based on foreign direct investment that sought low-
cost assembly at a large scale. The city’s economy gradually upgraded and now it hosts 
some of the most innovative companies in China. By some measurements, Shenzhen is 
the most innovative city in China (Sonn, 2017). In 2015, the city’s GDP per capita was 
US$21,643 (Statistical Bureau of Shenzhen, 2015), one of the highest among all major 
cities in China. This economic growth is reflected by fast development in a built 
environment, which is succinctly summarised by what people said about Shenzhen in the 
1990s: ‘one high-rise a day and one boulevard every three days’. Even by Chinese 
standards, where large-scale developments are rapidly completed (Li, 2015), Shenzhen’s 
physical development has been unusual. While the decentralisation of state finance has 
made all cities compete for growth, Shenzhen is one of the most aggressive (Davis, 2016; 
Ren, 2015; Shi and Chen, 2016).  
OCT Loft is situated within the northern section of the East Industrial Zone of OCT 
Shenzhen. The Loft is divided into the South and North Parks that cover approximately 
0.15 km2 (Xie, 2012). The South Park covers 55,465 m2. Its floor area is 59,000 m2. The 
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North Park covers 95,571 m2 and has a floor area of 150,000 m2 (Shi, Zhu, and Qing, 
2012). 
According to the official statistics of OCT Loft (2015), there are seven exhibition 
halls, 129 design-related firms, and 27 non-design businesses. The design-related firms 
include architectural design studios, furniture design studios, cartoon firms, entertainment 
businesses, industrial design studios, fine art studios, art agencies, bookstores, galleries, 
animation studios, fashion houses, food companies, magazine publishers, and other 
creative agencies. However, many of our interviewees indicated the existence of even 
more entities in the quarter because the directory is not updated frequently and smaller 
sublets of space are not included. Indeed, Zhou and Yu’s (2015) estimate might be more 
credible than the official statistics. They claim that of the 221 businesses, 151 are in 
various creative industry sectors. 
The area attracts tourists as well as design professionals because it offers hotels, 
restaurants, and bars and it frequently hosts high-profile art- and design-related activities 
such as exhibitions, lectures, seminars, and fairs. Some of the most high-profile activities 
held in OCT Loft include the Shenzhen/Hong Kong Bi-City Biennales of 
Urbanism/Architecture, the International Jazz Festival, the T-Street Creative Fair, and the 
Shenzhen Biennales of Independent Motion Pictures, each known to host some of the 
best achievements in its field in Mainland China. 
The Huaqiaocheng Jituan Gongsi (华侨城集团公司), or Overseas Chinese Town 
(OCT) Group, used its various arms; however, OCT Real Estate, the real estate arm of 
OCT Group, was in charge. The Xiangning Art Museum and its subsidiary, the OCT 
Contemporary Art Terminal (OCAT), also participated in the planning and investment 
process (interview with Mr. Wang, a mid-level manager at the OCT Loft Company, on 8 
February 2013). The Loft Company, set up to manage the Loft, is a subsidiary of OCT 
Real Estate. 
OCT Group is a Shenzhen-based large-scale state-owned holding company that 
owns tourism, real estate, and electronics manufacturing businesses. Tourism is 
considered to be its main business. OCT is arguably the largest brand name in the 
Chinese tourism industry. It owns popular theme parks such as Happy Valley and 
Splendid China in major cities in China. It also owns several hotel chains. 
Simultaneously, OCT is also one of the largest real estate developers in China. The OCT 
Group is a state-owned ‘key enterprise’, a status given to some of the largest and most 
important state-owned firms in China (OCT Group, 2014). This status within the 
government hierarchy is actually higher than the status of the City of Shenzhen, which is 
a sub-provincial-level city. This implies that the company wields strong bargaining power 
over the local government when making planning decisions. Within the industry and 
market, OCT is considered to be a high-end property developer (interview with a realtor 
conducted on 12 February 2012). 
 
3.2. Development Process 
Before its development, the site was an industrial park owned by OCT, or Huaqiao 
Cheng. During the 1990s, the Eastern Industrial Zone housed nearly 60 industrial 
enterprises, including electronics firms such as Konka Group and a large number of light-
industry enterprises (Xie, 2012). These factories gradually left the site as wage levels 
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increased and the city’s economic structure changed. Simultaneously, as the city grew, 
the site became more attractive to other potential land uses. 
Factory conversions began in 2004 in the area now known as the South Park. The 
quarter began to host major cultural institutions such as the Contemporary Art Centre (a 
non-profit), a subsidiary institution of the National Art Museum, which is owned and 
managed by the OCT Group. The Loft’s debut occurred in December 2005, when it 
hosted the first Shenzhen/Hong Kong Bi-City Biennale of Urbanism/Architecture. 
The total cost of the initial construction of OCT Loft approached 30 million yuan. 
The construction costs for the Contemporary Art Centre alone amounted to 20 million 
yuan (Jin, 2013). This was an unusually high level of investment, considering that the 
prospect for profits was unclear. Urbanus Architecture & Design, a prestigious Hong 
Kong-based architectural firm, was hired to design the Loft. Once design and planning 
began, the OCT Group began to search for potential tenants. 
The OCT Group found inspiration from external sources. Experts worldwide were 
asked to sit on its advisory board. That list of advisors included Deyan Sudjic, the curator 
of Design Museum London, and Taku Satoh, the director of 21_21 Design Sight, as well 
as other well-known names within China. Yifei Chen, one of China’s most renowned 
contemporary artists, was invited and listened to. He warned that if individual designers 
were to occupy the Loft, it would end up becoming like 798. He suggested that OCT 
should bring in established firms and organisations. That suggestion was well integrated 
into the development plan of OCT Loft (OCT Loft Company, 2014). 
Mr. Sun, a mid-level manager at OCT Real Estate, stated that external influences 
have affected the Loft’s theme (Interview on 8 February 2013). In or around 2003, the 
concept of ‘the Loft’ had spread widely because of the extensive media coverage of 
Beijing 798. Research on 798 led OCT researchers to search for and gain a better 
understanding of similar cases globally. A team of researchers helped OCT management 
conclude that Yaletown, Vancouver offered the most transferrable model. They thought 
they could do better than 798, Xintiandi, or M50 and become the best in China by 
learning from overseas cases rather than from Chinese cases. Design was chosen as the 
theme of the development because researchers and the OCT Group’s decision-makers 
believed design was the only theme in which Shenzhen had a competitive advantage. We 
were repeatedly told by our interviewees that the choice of design was obvious. Shenzhen 
is a new city inhabited by a young, hard-working population. It does not have the 
institutional and cultural foundation for classical or contemporary fine arts that Beijing 
has (interview with Ms. Jia, a writer for OCT Magazine, the company’s internal magazine 
on 8 February 2013). 
The first tenant, Kenneth Ko, moved into the Loft in 2003. Kenneth Ko is a 
successful designer/celebrity. When the Loft was officially inaugurated in January 2007, 
it already contained more than 20 institutions (NEWS GD, 2007). At that time, in 
addition to Kenneth Ko’s workshop, the list of institutions included the offices of a 
celebrity designer from Hong Kong, Liang Jinghua, Urbanus Architecture & Design, 
Hongbo Information Company’s animation design base, and the OCT International 
Media and Entertainment Company. 
 
<Figure 2 OCT Loft master plan (Source: Liu, Meng, and Wang, 2013)> 
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In the same year as OCT Loft launched with the near-completed South Park (Figure 
2), the North Park’s development began. While the South Park mixes cultural production 
and consumption with amenities, the North Park focuses on uses directly related to design 
industries such as workshops and exhibition spaces. The North Park officially opened on 
14 May 2011. According to Zhou and Lei’s (2015) survey, the respective shares of 
creative industry firms and retail shops are 74% and 15% of the 165 establishments in the 
North Park, while they are 52% and 45% of the 56 establishments in the South.  
 
<Figure 3. South Park> 
<Figure 4. North Park> 
 
Throughout this process, the Shenzhen government provided both formal and 
informal support to the Loft. Formally, the city offered tax cuts to design firms that lease 
space in the Loft. Informally, the city instituted informal zoning changes. To ease the 
application and bidding procedure, the local government allowed OCT to use lands for 
different uses, even though the lands are located within the industrial zone. Cultural 
industrial use is acceptable in the industrial zone; however, there are numerous shops and 
stores in the Loft. As long as the shops nominally comply with the document’s zoning 
regulations, the local government informally overlook its actual use. (Interview 
conducted with Dr. Pu, an elite planning consultant, on 8 May 2012). 
 
 
4. Evaluating OCT Loft 
The success of OCT Loft can be inferred from its growing annual output. In 2012, 
only a year after the grand opening of the entire OCT Loft (including both the South and 
the North Parks), the annual output of its tenant firms reached US$1.17 billion. That 
figure rose to US$1.36 billion in 2013 and to over US$1.5 billion in 2014. Its estimated 
total employment of over 2,000 individuals makes it comparable to China’s most famous 
cultural and creative industrial clusters such as 798 (Zhang, 2014). 
Most interviewed employees and tenant firm owners in the Loft claimed that it has 
cultivated a culture-rich and artistic atmosphere through its overall planning and 
operation, which significantly benefits both the reputation of the firms and their everyday 
practice. It was also acknowledged by the interviewees that the designers of the Loft 
create their own unique designs rather than copying existing ones as most design firms in 
Shenzhen do. As Shi, Zhu, and Wan (2012) recognise, the presence of leading Chinese 
industrial design firms such as LKK Design, Thray, and Ciga Design is a good indication 
that the Loft has become one of a small number of places where original designs are 
created. 
According to Kenneth Ko, who has advised developers of cultural and creative 
clusters in Mainland China (e.g. 798 in Beijing and Kuanzhai Alley in Chengdu), ‘OCT 
Loft is particularly good in that it has successfully developed and maintains an 
atmosphere that a cultural and creative cluster should have’. Formal and informal 
interactions among firms are also common. Mr. Gao, the owner of a brand design studio, 
confirmed that he often cooperates with design studios that have complementary 
specialties (interview conducted on 7 July 2015). 
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This cultural quarter also attracts business visitors from within and outside the city 
and region. During our random interviews with customers in a Starbucks Coffee Shop in 
the South Park, we met two professionals who work for a mid-size property developer at 
Changsha. Their company was considering a contract with an interior design company in 
the Loft for its next apartment project and they were contemplating the purchase of 
furniture they could use in their show apartment. They stated that Shenzhen’s design 
firms and those located in the Loft in particular are regarded as the best in the country. 
However, the two disagreed on one point. When one of them said, ‘We came here instead 
of Shanghai and Beijing because firms in those cities set the price too high’, the other 
countered, ‘I think Shenzhen is the best in interior design and furniture design not only in 
terms of low price but also for its high quality’. 
The Loft is regarded as a ‘chic place’ in the city, and it attracts both local consumers 
and tourists. Given that most shops in the Loft are run by designers, they have a 
sophisticated décor and unique features. For example, chefs and kitchen staff play jazz 
music in a noodle shop, small exhibitions take place in craftwork shops, and decorations 
collected from all over the world are displayed in a hair salon. In Idutang, a bar in the 
Loft, Chinese rockers, Mongolian folk singers, German guitarists, and American jazz 
singers perform every night. There are also several high-end and mid-range Chinese, 
fusion, and Western restaurants. All of these cultural elements blend into the other 
businesses in the Loft, and lay a foundation for its ‘coolness’ factor. Leaders of the local 
cultural scenes and affluent expats are attracted to the Loft’s atmosphere. Young local 
people hang out there, too. In 2015, because of the popularity of the T-Street Creative 
Fair among tourists, the Loft management centre held the event twice a month instead of 
once a month to satisfy the demand of visitors. 
The success of OCT has created various effects that are not easily quantified. Many 
entrepreneurs think that being a tenant in the Loft is beneficial. According to Mr. Gao in 
the interview cited above, a client ‘has a lot more respect for and interest in us because 
we are at OCT’. For Omnialuo, moving to the Loft was a signal that the company is 
different from the rest of the city’s clothing industry and that it wants to be known for its 
original designs (Mr. Cu, an executive of Omnialuo, interview on 13 January 2012). 
Many firms still try to rent space in the Loft, even with the rent being so costly, but fail in 
the application process for various reasons. 
Generally, the successful development of a cultural quarter is likely to cause three 
problems: changes of space use, displacement of residents, and affordability (Evans, 2005, 
2009; Rantisi, 2004; Zukin, 1982). Although the change of space use did happen in the 
Loft, the developer found a reasonable solution. The success of the initial development, 
currently known as the South Park, led to the commercialisation of the space. Restaurants, 
bars, and coffee shops replaced design studios. In response, OCT constructed a new space 
specifically for design studios in the North Park. The second potential problem, the 
displacement of residents, was not too large a concern for the Loft development, either. 
The area’s original tenants were factory workers who had to move when their jobs were 
relocated to more peripheral areas of the city. Indeed, many old factory buildings were 
already abandoned by the time the initial conversion started. Therefore, unlike many 
other successful redevelopment cases, only minimal criticism related to the displacement 
of the original residents was expressed. 
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Unlike the first and second potential problems, the third problem materialised. With 
the success of the Loft, the OCT Loft Company increased rents to a level unaffordable for 
small design firms and start-ups. One designer/entrepreneur, Mr. Chang, complained that 
‘Famous firms get benefits but (the) small, less famous end up paying the full fee’. Yet, 
he admitted that OCT rents remain cheaper than rents in the CBD area (interview 
conducted on 12 February 2012). According to Ms. Jia, a writer for OCT Magazine, 
based on the OCT Loft’s considerable popularity, the OCT Loft Company changed 
tenancy contracts from initial five-year leases to three-year leases. Ultimately, they only 
issued one-year leases. She also attributed recent rent increases at wider OCT 
development to the Loft’s success. Lily’s view was supported by a realtor who claimed 
that the area immediately adjacent to the Loft experienced about a 100% increase in rents 
over the past 10 years. Although inevitably complaining about the rising rent, firms still 
show a strong preference for sticking around rather than looking for a cheaper location. 
Given all the evidence, it seems reasonable to conclude that OCT Loft accomplished 
a certain level of success according to various standards. In the next section, we search 
for the reasons behind its success. 
 
5. Explaining its Success 
To explain the reasons for the success of OFT Loft, the advantage of its host city, 
Shenzhen, cannot be overlooked. As noted in Section 3.1, Shenzhen is an advantageous 
location for a cultural industry cluster. Even in Shenzhen, however, not all projects are 
successful. For example, the Annual Shenzhen International Cultural Industry Fair, part 
of the local government’s ambitious plan to be the centre of the cultural industry in China 
and beyond, has struggled to internationalise (Qianhai Media, 2016). The success of OCT 
Loft, aside from its favourable Shenzhen location, should thus be understood. Our 
analysis shows two prominent factors. 
 
5.1. The right choice of target industry 
The first factor is that the choice of design as the target industry was appropriate, as 
touched upon in Section 3. The design industry’s prominence is related to the city’s rapid 
growth. A huge number of houses for families had to be built when the population 
increased from several thousand to 10 million over the course of three decades, even 
though a large percentage of that population increase consisted of migrant workers 
housed in dormitories. The production of housing, in turn, increased demand for various 
design services such as architectural and interior design, furniture, and decorative art 
design. At the same time, an increasing number of start-ups as well as some of the largest 
IT companies in Shenzhen demanded advertising, web design, and other design-related 
services (interview conducted with Mr. Chang, designer/entrepreneur, on 12 February 
2012). 
On the supply side, the city’s status as a free economic zone and its proximity to 
Hong Kong strongly influenced its ability to attract talent and learn from advanced, 
imported practices. Since the late 1980s, Shenzhen has attracted many young artists and 
designers. These individuals have created small firms to sell their designs to Shenzhen’s 
large manufacturers and property developers. This led Shenzhen to be one of the few 
cities in Mainland China where young designers can find opportunities to build their 
careers (interview with Mr. Chang, designer/entrepreneur, on 12 February 2012). Mr. 
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Chang also praised Shenzhen as one of the few places in China where designers could 
closely observe the latest international trends in design, branding, packaging, and 
advertising. Shenzhen’s proximity to Hong Kong offers inhabitants access to all major 
global brands. Consequently, design professionals in Shenzhen are proud of themselves. 
Furthermore, in our interviews in 2012, various design professionals claimed that ‘the 
designers in Shenzhen are at the top level in China’. 
Shenzhen does not host a prestigious art school. Therefore, the city is unable to 
educate its own creative workforce. In addition, Shenzhen does not host a local branch of 
the Chinese Artists Association, which has branches in most major cities in China. While 
this may have disadvantages in terms of the supply of young talents, the absence of 
authoritative figures such as art professors and older artists has allowed young designers 
to develop a higher sensitivity to market demand (interview with Mr. Chang, 
designer/entrepreneur, on 12 February 2012). 
In 2007, around the time when the South Park was completed, the annual output of 
Shenzhen’s cultural and creative industry reached US$7.7 billion, accounting for 6.8% of 
the city’s GDP for that year. Over 6,000 design companies, collectively employing more 
than 60,000 designers, clustered in the city at that time. The Shenzhen government tried 
to gain the support of the cultural and creative industries in 2004. The strength of the 
design industry in Shenzhen is now widely acknowledged. (Yang and Huang, 2010). 
A cluster development is more likely to succeed if the target industry is growing 
quickly. As Sonn and Liu (2014) argue, the best target industry is one growing in volume 
but that does not have a strong spatial core. Although design did have a spatial core in 
downtown Shenzhen, the industry needed a new core for two reasons. First, the 
expanding industry required more physical space. Second, aesthetic standards rose along 
with the growth of Shenzhen’s economy. Firms that successfully adjusted, or that wanted 
to adjust, to this higher standard wanted to detach themselves from the existing cluster. 
As exemplified by Omnialuo, this new generation of creative firms preferred a new 
location with a better physical environment. The choice of design as the target industry 
was the right one. 
 
5.2. Tenant selection and monitoring 
In our fieldwork, many of our interviewees praised OCT Real Estate for maintaining 
rigour in tenant selection. In the previous section, we briefly noted that during the early 
phases of development, OCT carefully handpicked its first group of tenants. Rather than 
advertising to the public, the management targeted a small number of designers 
considered to be prestigious by both the industry and the public. 
After choosing design as the target industry, the OCT Group carefully chose its 
tenants. It selected tenants that would not compromise the quarter’s theme. According to 
Mr. Wang, a mid-level manager at the OCT Loft Company, the first tenant group was 
extremely important because a careful selection of high-profile designers would signal 
the OCT Group’s commitment to the Loft to citizens, the media, and the country’s 
powerful politicians. It would also demonstrate the type of cultural quarter the OCT 
Group hoped to build (interview on 8 February 2013). 
Ms. Jia (a writer for OCT Magazine), Mr. Chang (designer/entrepreneur), and 
several other interviewees stated that the OCT Group offered selected tenants rental rates 
that were much lower than market rates. This is confirmed by information we gathered 
 11 
from the firm side. The senior manager of the Alliance Art Group, arguably one of the 
most influential firms in the art and entertainment arena as well as among the first to 
move into the northern part of the Loft, said that the Group was offered a rental rate in 
the Loft that was more than 10% lower than the market rate. Most interviewees, however, 
refused to reveal the details of their rental policy and admitted that rent varies among 
tenants. The first few high-profile tenants, especially OCAT, Kenneth Ko, Liang Jinghua 
Design Studio, Xiangning Art Museum, and Omnialuo, were instrumental in establishing 
the prestige of the Loft. 
Once the Loft was relatively well established, the management allowed all interested 
parties to apply for space. However, the selection process was not completely marketised. 
For one, OCT continued hunting for preferred high-profile art- and design-related firms. 
The case of the Alliance Art Group in 2010, an influential firm in the art and 
entertainment arena, illustrates this selection process. According to its senior manager, 
several cultural and creative parks in Shenzhen indicated their interest when the firm was 
looking for a new location to relocate its expanding workforce. However, the Loft 
Management Company and Nanshan District government offered favourable conditions 
to this company, with the understanding that its inclusion would add to the Loft’s prestige. 
Both OCT and the Nanshan District government offered an approximately 8% reduction 
in rent, which the Alliance Art Group found preferable. 
In addition to offering incentives to preferred firms, many of our interviewees who 
were tenants at the Loft indicated that the Loft Company had strict criteria for selecting 
tenants from the large numbers of applications it received. The owner of a design 
bookstore indicated how competitive the process was. According to him, many bookstore 
owners wanted space in the Loft, but he eventually was chosen because ‘they learned that 
[my] bookstore had a unique theme that fit in well with the overall concept of the Loft’. 
 During selection, the Loft Company places more weight on the visions and business 
plans of applicants than on their predicted size and profitability. Applicants are required 
to present their vision and plan through a detailed slideshow to Loft Company executives. 
Even invited firms such as the Alliance Art Group are required to go through the same 
process. Many potentially influential applicants have failed such a process. For instance, 
a company whose name was not revealed to us applied for 6,000 m2 of office space for 
over 100 workers. The application was rejected because the decision-makers at OCT Loft 
felt that a large company’s occupancy of such a space would reduce the potential for 
diversity within the Loft (interview with Lily, an urban designer, on 14 February 2012). 
After gaining tenancy, the tenants are still under the Loft’s strict supervision. The 
Loft monitors tenant firms and evaluates their progress against their submitted plans. 
Those that have developed products or services that diverge from the Loft’s view, or 
those that are not performing well, are sanctioned through rent policies. The Loft 
Company negotiates rent with each individual firm and offers a favourable price to those 
worth supporting, while raising the price to those they want to remove, according to the 
manager of the Alliance Art Group and several other firm owners in the Loft. 
It is through such a combination of strategic invitation, strict selection, and 
continued monitoring that the Loft is able to maintain a collection of high-quality tenant 
firms. These restrictive management strategies, however, go against the common view of 
the conditions for creativity. As we saw in Section 2, freedom is commonly thought of as 
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an important condition for creativity. However, those involved in OCT Loft management 
believe otherwise. 
An executive from the OCT Group argued such a tight management style is essential 
to the Loft’s success. She does not believe that creative people can self-govern. She 
argued that ‘those creative types are not good at managing things’ and that is why OCT 
‘provides a clear guideline (as to) what designers can do and what they can’t do’ 
(interview on 12 May 2012). She also claimed that creative enterprises tend to lack 
management skills and long-term strategies. The creative community’s much-celebrated 
creativity, diversity, and spontaneity can be accompanied by short-sightedness, financial 
instability, and a lack of continuity. Ms. Jia, a writer for OCT Magazine, agreed when she 
said, ‘If the quarter is left to manage itself, it will destroy itself.’ Mr. Sun, a mid-level 
manager at OCT Real Estate, went a step further. He argued that it is better to set clear 
boundaries and leave little room for negotiation in terms of the business plan and vision 
of the Loft because ‘designers have strong egos. Everyone thinks he is the best. They 
need management by someone who can kick them out’. (Interview on 8 February 2013) 
 However, the executive did admit that OCT’s tight management style might 
negatively affect community-mindedness among the designers who rent space. She 
argued that this issue is partially addressed by the participation mechanism. Yet, to the 
authors of this paper, the activities described by the editor and other interviewees 
sounded more like unpaid labour than participation. For example, Omnialuo has to 
organise receptions when the OCT Group has high-profile visitors such as high-ranking 
officials from the central government, even if the visit is not related to OCT Loft. Smaller 
tenants are also required to ‘participate’. Mr. Chang, a designer/entrepreneur, stated that 
all his friends who rent a small space in the Loft ‘help in one way or another’. He has 
personally helped the company recruit designers, engaged in exhibition planning, and 
participated in designing the Loft magazine, among other tasks, although he has not yet 
relocated his office to the Loft (interview on 12 February 2012). A senior manager from 
the Alliance Art Group also confirmed that OCT provides bands and singers for activities 
taking place at the Loft, such as the opening of exhibitions and creative fairs. OCT may 
or may not offer financial compensation for the tenants’ contributions. It can avoid 
paying compensation because the tenancy itself is regarded as a reward. Maintaining a 
good relationship with OCT management can thus be helpful when a tenant renews the 
rental contract. This type of tight management style is possible because OCT can invest 
large sums of money yearly in research and daily operations. 
It should be noted here that these management strategies are not based on 
revolutionary new ideas. Indeed, such strategies are similar to those suggested by 
practitioners and academics for business incubators, high-tech clusters, and cultural 
industry clusters. The real question is why these strategies, which could not be 
implemented in most top-down developments, could be implemented at OCT Loft. 
The main reason is that the Loft did not intend to make an immediate profit. 
According to Mr. Wang (interview on 8 August 2012), a mid-level manager at OCT, the 
developers were conscious of the danger that profit-seeking can bring. He said 798 in 
Beijing became a theme park-like place because the high rents there drove out artists. 
According to him, OCT could increase its profits by either selling the South Park or 
duplicating the South Park in the North Park, but it chose not to. The flea markets and 
 13 
jazz festivals cost money rather than earn it, but OCT still does these events because they 
attract creative professionals and add flavour to the Loft. 
The OCT Loft Company in charge of managing the Loft is a subsidiary of OCT Real 
Estate. The company earns 60 million RMB rental income from the Loft. The other part 
of the income is the subsidy from OCT Real Estate. However, OCT Real Estate does not 
consider the Loft to be a charity mission because the value of the Loft clearly exceeds its 
income. According to Ms. Jia (a writer for OCT Magazine), the Loft is the showpiece of 
the OCT Group. It is used to demonstrate the group’s sophistication. This further adds 
value to the prestige of OCT’s brand name, thereby making OCT’s projects such as 
residential development more profitable. It is also important when the company 
persuades political leaders in the national and local governments about opportunities for 
regenerations in other major cities (interview on 8 February 2013). In transplanting the 
Shenzhen OCT model into other major cities in China, including Shanghai, Beijing, and 
Chengdu, OCT Loft is frequently shown as an example of successful cultural-led urban 
regeneration (OCT Magazine, 2010). 
 
6. Academic and policy implications 
The Loft is a successful case of a large-scale cultural industry cluster development 
project in the sense that its creative workers and entrepreneurs are satisfied with the 
environment, the location is gaining prestige in the industry, and business visitors and 
tourists are attracted to it. The displacement of residents and gentrification, the most 
common negative outcomes of this type of regeneration project, are less severe than in 
other cases because the majority of the original residents were dormitory residents who 
worked in OCT factories and were willing to follow the relocation of factories. 
The main reasons for the Loft’s success are 1) its choice of industry and 2) its strict 
administrative controls in tenant selection and monitoring. While these sound like 
sufficiently simple ideas, neither is easy to implement. The Loft’s choice of design as the 
target industry was possible because the design industry was growing fast and needed 
more and better space. Urban regeneration projects are more likely to be implemented in 
cities in which industries are declining rather than growing. As such, selecting a growing 
industry is often difficult. Most major regeneration projects are designed to host cultural 
industries, financial industries, high-technology industries, or prestigious retail. Yet, the 
total volume of those industries is limited in the national and global economy, meaning 
that not all such regeneration projects can host them. 
Even after the right industry was chosen, had the developer wanted the immediate 
maximisation of profit, the Loft would not have been hosting all the prestigious firms it 
does presently. The fate of the project was heavily dependent upon the fact that OCT 
Real Estate did not aim for immediate profit. The purpose of the project was to show the 
ability of this ambitious developer as a means to win contracts for similar projects outside 
Shenzhen. The developer continues to strictly choose creative firms that are respected in 
the industry instead of those with higher rent bids. This reduces rental income, which a 
profit-maximising developer may not prefer. 
As such, the Loft’s success cannot be randomly transplanted in other cities. The key 
factor is to do it in a city that has similar conditions. The two conditions stated above 
seem rare because most culture-led regeneration has been attempted in deindustrialised 
cities in advanced economies where economic dynamism is long gone. In China, cities 
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with the highest income levels are experiencing deindustrialisation without losing their 
wealth. It is more of an upgrade to their economic base rather than deindustrialisation in 
its traditional sense. In such cities, a cultural industry might still prosper and thus need 
more space to expand. Furthermore, in China and other high-growth economies, 
sacrificing short-term profit for a larger market share in the future is a common strategy, 
which is related to the country’s risk-taking culture (Hsee and Weber, 1999). As such, it 
might be possible to find a developer such as OCT that is willing to pay a high cost to 
build a reputation that will lead to higher profits in the long run. 
From a theoretical perspective, the findings of this study offer a criticism of the 
mainstream opposition to the top-down development of cultural clusters. At different 
scales, top-down management has proven to be effective when certain conditions are met. 
For example, as many social scientists agree, the state management played an important 
role in the economic success of East Asia (Amsden, 1989; Chang, 1994; Duckett, 2001; 
Johnson, 1982; Kim and Choi, 2015; Oi, 1992; 1995; Saich, 2010; Sonn, 2007; Sonn and 
Gimm, 2013; Sonn and Lee, 2015; Wade, 1990; Woo-Cumings, 1999; Walder, 1995; Wu, 
2003). Such a process was hardly bottom-up. The authoritarian government decided 
which industry to support and how, with input from the top of business communities 
while disregarding demand from the bottom. Whether such a practice should be praised 
from political and ethical perspectives is also important question, but these successes do 
show that top-down management can be effective in some cases. The bottom-up strategy 
is not the only way for innovation to transpire at the firm level either. It has been the 
largest companies’ R&D labs that have produced the majority of innovations (Sonn and 
Storper, 2008), at least after the 1920s when R&D became a part of normal business in 
large manufacturing companies (Rosenberg, 1983). Similarly, some of the world’s 
greatest innovations occurred within the R&D labs of multinational firms in Japan and 
South Korea (e.g. Sony, Toshiba, and Samsung), where the hierarchical culture is even 
more dominant than that in their Western counterparts. 
If top-down management can drive innovation at the national or firm level, we 
cannot preclude the possibility of its effectiveness at the cluster level. The conventional 
answer would be that culture involves individual creativity, which flourishes only when 
individuals are given freedom to pursue what they want. However, psychologists of 
creativity generally agree that creativity is not an outcome of unrestricted freedom. 
Rather, an effort to work within restrictions or to overcome them is a more likely source 
of creation. Therefore, restrictions are not a barrier but rather a necessary condition for 
creativity (Sternberg, 1988). Resonating with this theoretical reasoning, OCT Loft 
punctures the myth in urban research about cultural industry clusters. 
Although this study assesses top-down management by a real estate developer, top-
down management by the state is also in the background. The development of the Loft 
was within the context of the promotion of creativity and cultural industries at the central 
government level, as manifested in the 10th Five-Year Plan (2001–2006) and the 
Ministry of Culture’s Cultural Industries Revitalisation Plan in 2009 (Wen, 2012). The 
discourse of ‘soft power’ also sets the context for developments such as the Loft 
(Leonard, 2008). Being a state-owned company, the OCT Group is likely to want to 
comply with this trend at the national level. At the local level, in compliance with the 
central government’s emphasis on creative industries, Shenzhen had been promoting 
itself as ‘city of design’, as mentioned earlier. Given the rising labour cost in the coastal 
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areas of China, Shenzhen had to diversify its economy to various non-manufacturing 
sectors including cultural industries (O’Dennell et al., 2017). In that sense, the local 
government has been willing to support projects such as the Loft. This political context, 
to which the OCT Group probably gave serious thought, is an interesting topic for further 
research on the Loft. 
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